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Second-generation	family	CEOs:	are	they	up	to	the
task?
Family	firms	are	the	most	prevalent	type	of	firm	in	the	world.	This	is	especially	true	in	emerging	economies,	where
they	account	for	over	half	of	medium-sized	firms	in	the	manufacturing	sector.	In	particular,	dynastic	family	firms	–	that
is,	where	the	founding	family	owns	a	controlling	share	and	have	appointed	a	second-generation	(or	later)	family
member	as	the	CEO	–	account	for	a	quarter	of	these	firms.
Since	supporting	such	firms	as	the	“backbone	of	the	economy”	is	politically	popular	(as	this	skilfully	edited	video	from
Last	Week	Tonight	with	John	Oliver	shows),	it	is	crucial	to	understand	more	about	these	firms.	More	specifically,	we
need	to	understand	how	they	operate	and	what	their	impact	is	on	the	economy	and	labour	markets.	Although	there	is
mixed	evidence	on	whether	family	ownership	is	a	good	thing,	the	weight	of	the	evidence	is	that	dynastic	family	CEOs
are	usually	bad	news	for	productivity.	But	why	is	that	the	case?
Poor	management	practices	have	been	widely	shown	to	causally	affect	productivity,	and	in	a	job	market	paper	we
show	the	first	causal	evidence	that	dynastic	family	firms	have	worse	management	practices:	about	-0.8	standard
deviations	(SD).	Combined	with	production	function	estimates	of	the	correlation	between	management	and
productivity,	this	effect	implies	a	possible	productivity	hit	of	5	to	10	per	cent.	But	if	these	practices	lead	to	better	firm
performance,	why	are	CEOs	not	already	adopting	them?	To	consider	the	reasons	behind	this	managerial
underperformance	we	build	a	simple	stylized	model	to	explore	how	family-firm-specific	reputation	costs,	which	seem
to	push	first-generation	CEOs	to	do	better,	might	act	as	a	constraint	on	management	innovation	for	second-
generation	CEOs.
Dynastic	family-owned	firms	have	worse	management	practices,	but	only	if	run	by	family	CEOs
Despite	the	global	prevalence	of	family	firms,	research	on	this	topic	is	often	stymied	by	lack	of	good	data	on	private
firms.	One	large	project	that	has	worked	to	remedy	some	of	this	gap	is	the	World	Management	Survey	(WMS).	The
WMS	uses	a	survey	tool	covering	18	management	topics	scored	on	a	scale	of	1	to	5	(worst	to	best).	Having	worked
on	this	project	for	nearly	a	decade,	we	noticed	one	stubborn	pattern	across	countries:	family	firms	consistently
placed	in	the	bottom	of	the	management	quality	rankings.
Figure	1:	Firms	run	by	dynastic	CEOs	tend	to	have	worse	management
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	Figure	1	shows	the	cumulative	distribution	of	management	scores	for	firms	run	by	dynastic	family	CEOs,	firms	run
by	a	professional	CEO	but	owned	by	families,	and	all	other	non-family	firms.	What	is	immediately	obvious	is	that,
much	as	the	literature	suggests,	family	ownership	does	not	seem	to	be	an	issue	per	se,	but	rather	the	difference
seems	to	be	driven	by	the	choice	of	CEO.	But	how	to	address	the	endogeneity	issues	inherent	in	successions
decisions?
	New	data	on	family	characteristics	helps	identify	causal	effect	of	dynastic	CEO	successions
Previous	research	has	either	focused	on	public	firms	(here)	or	exploited	the	rich	datasets	of	Denmark	(here).	In	our
best	attempt	at	mimicking	such	administrative	datasets	in	countries	where	they	do	not	exist,	we	developed	a	new
survey	to	collect	data	on	the	history	of	succession	of	ownership	and	control,	as	well	family	characteristics	of	family
CEOs.	We	used	the	WMS	sample	of	firms	and	interviewed	over	2700	firms	in	2014,	though	a	large	share	of	these
firms	were	still	first-generation	founder	firms	or	had	not	been	founded	by	a	single	family	or	founder.
At	the	end,	a	total	of	810	firms	from	12	countries	had	undergone	at	least	one	succession	originating	from	a	founder
or	family	firm	at	the	time	we	interviewed	them.	To	identify	the	causal	relationship	between	dynastic	CEO	successions
and	management	quality,	we	follow	an	instrumental	variables	approach.	Given	the	total	number	of	the	outgoing
CEO’s	children,	how	many	of	them	happen	to	be	boys	is	as	good	as	random.	This	gives	us	a	neat	instrument	for
dynastic	CEO	successions:	we	find	that	outgoing	CEOs	who	have	at	least	one	son	are	about	30	percentage	points
more	likely	to	keep	the	firm	in	the	family	than	those	who	had	no	boys.
Figure	2:	Outgoing	CEOs	who	had	at	least	one	son	are	more	likely	to	keep	the	firm	in	the	family
LSE Business Review: Second-generation family CEOs: are they up to the task? Page 2 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-01-18
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2018/01/18/second-generation-family-ceos-are-they-up-to-the-task/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
Figure	2	depicts	this	pattern:	for	each	category	representing	the	number	of	sons	of	the	outgoing	CEO,	each	block
indicates	the	identity	of	the	new	CEO.	Assuming	that	the	gender	of	the	outgoing	CEO’s	children	is	unrelated	to	their
choices	of	management	practices,	we	estimate	that	a	succession	to	a	family	CEO	leads	to	0.8	standard	deviations
worse	management	practices	relative	to	firms	with	successions	to	non-family	CEOs.	But	why	might	that	be?
	Mechanisms:	what	gives?
The	second	part	of	our	analysis	focuses	on	understanding	why	firms	led	by	family	CEOs	adopt	fewer	structured
management	practices.	There	are	a	number	of	reasons	underlying	the	difficulties	in	effecting	organizational	change,
and	the	two	mechanisms	often	ascribed	to	family	firms	relate	to	lower	levels	of	skill	(here,	here	and	here)	and	lack	of
awareness	of	managerial	underperformance	(here,	here	and	here).	Neither	of	these	mechanisms,	however,	fully
explain	the	gap	in	management	underperformance.
We	propose	a	different	possibility	based	on	the	wealth	of	evidence	that	suggests	family	firms	have	implicit
employment	commitments	with	their	workers.	Evidence	of	such	commitments	includes	providing	better	job	security
as	a	compensating	differential	for	lower	wages	and	firing	fewer	employees	when	hit	by	negative	productivity	shocks.
We	build	a	simple	theoretical	framework	and	propose	that,	because	of	these	implicit	commitments,	family	CEOs	incur
a	“reputation	cost”	of	firing	workers.	If	we	think	of	management	as	a	monitoring	technology	that	allows	CEOs	to
observe	their	workers’	productivity,	it	is	only	profitable	to	invest	in	the	technology	if	the	CEOs	then	use	the
information	to	discipline	the	low	productivity	workers.	Thus,	the	“reputation	cost”	incurred	by	family	CEOs	may	act	as
a	constraint	on	investing	in	this	technology.	We	find	empirical	support	for	the	predictions	of	the	model.
Policy	take-away
LSE Business Review: Second-generation family CEOs: are they up to the task? Page 3 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-01-18
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2018/01/18/second-generation-family-ceos-are-they-up-to-the-task/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
Although	a	naive	solution	could	be	that	all	family	firms	hire	professional	CEOs,	that	would	be	an	unrealistic
prescription.	There	are	binding	institutional	constraints	that	bar	many	firm	owners	in	emerging	economies	from
pursuing	this	avenue	—	for	example,	if	there	are	thin	markets	for	managerial	talent	or	weak	legal	systems	that	might
fail	to	protect	owners	from	devious	CEOs	—	and	also	owner-managers	preferences	for	being	their	own	boss.	If	we
accept	family	control	is	the	necessary	(or	preferred)	control	structure	for	many	firms,	it	is	crucial	to	understand	what
may	be	the	barriers	to	investment	in	better	management	practices	within	family	firms.
What	can	CEOs	do?
While	policy-makers	can	seek	to	improve	the	environment	to	allow	firm	owners	to	consider	hiring	professional	CEOS,
there	is	also	something	family	firm	CEOs	can	do	by	tackling	each	of	the	(non-exhaustive)	issues	we	raised	in	turn.
The	first	prescription	is	to	go	through	an	honest	self-diagnostic:	the	WMS	website	has	a	handy	self-evaluation	tool
that	allows	for	self-evaluation	as	well	as	national	and	industrial	benchmarking.	The	second	prescription	is	to	take	the
identified	bottlenecks	from	the	self-evaluation	tool	fix	the	issues.	If	it	is	not	immediately	obvious	how	to	do	it,	there
are	a	number	of	online	resources	that	can	help	improve	management	skills	(for	example,	here	and	here).	Third,
taking	into	account	that	the	relationship	between	family	CEOs	and	their	employees	is	distinct	from	other	firms,	it	is
important	to	involve	the	employees	in	the	process	of	organizational	change	such	that	change	can	be	long-lasting.	In
particular,	it	is	important	to	understand	that	improving	monitoring	in	the	firm	can	be	useful	even	if	dismissing
employees	is	not	an	option	–	there	are	still	a	number	of	employee	improvement	policies	that	can	be	enacted	once	the
diagnosis	is	made.
Tl;dr
	We	push	the	literature	forward	in	two	main	ways:	first,	we	show	the	first	causal	evidence	that	dynastic	family	CEO
successions	lead	to	worse	management.	Second,	we	go	beyond	the	usual	suggestions	of	improving	information	and
skills,	and	suggest	that	the	specific	labour	context	that	family	firms	act	in	is	important.	We	propose	that	the	implicit
employment	commitments	between	family	managers	and	their	workers	should	factor	into	both	how	management
upgrading	projects	are	presented	to	prospective	firm	managers	as	well	as	into	the	expected	take-up	and	long-term
adherence	of	such	improvements.	This	is	a	key	consideration	as	many	organisations	push	forward	in	enacting
management	upgrading	projects	around	the	world.
You	may	also	like:
In	family-owned	businesses,	professional	CEOs	work	longer	hours	than	owner-CEOs
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